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THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL'S
QUEST FOR EFFECTIVENESS
Emilio J. Cdrdenas*
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York's World
Trade Center Towers and Washington's Pentagon, instantly refocused the
United Nations' attention on the issue of international terrorism. The
Security Council (Council) responded immediately: first, on September
12, 2001, with an unequivocal condemnation of the attacks, contained in
Resolution 1368 (2001),' and second, on September 28, 2001, with the
enactment of Resolution 1373 (2001), which, under Chapter VII of the
Charter, mandated that all Member States take specific actions to combat
international terrorism.' Terrorism was rightly understood to be "a threat
to international peace and security."3
Resolution 1373 rapidly became a landmark. It "broke new ground"
by using, for the first time ever, the Council's Chapter VII powers to di-
rect all Member States to take steps to do or refrain from doing what it
mandates, in a general context not directly related to disciplining any
individual country or particular non-state actor.4
When they discipline individual countries or non-state actors, the
Council's resolutions are enforceable because of the tie existing between
the specific resolution and the possibility of suffering sanctions for non-
compliance. By contrast, resolutions of a general scope or nature, to be
effective, must be seen, both by Member States and by non-state actors,
as enforceable. When legislating in a general manner, unless the Security
Council shows, from the outset, its determination to enforce such resolu-
tions, the possibility of violators being confronted with sanctions may
look remote. As we will see, the Security Council seems to be aware of
this difference.
Resolution 1373, through which the Council assumed a general
legislative capacity, was, under Articles 25 and 48 of the UN Charter,
directly binding on each and every one of the Member States.5 In
* Ambassador and former Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United
Nations; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (Spring 2004).
1. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
2. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
3. Id. 3rd intro. para.
4. Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 901
(2002). The author points out that the Security Council has increasingly adopted decisions
related to conflicts in general on issues like the protection of children and civilians or the role
of women.
5. See id. at 905.
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addition, it reflected the prevailing view of the international community.6
The Council's general legislative power was used here in an indirect
manner by establishing, inter alia, that all Member States must criminalize
in their respective domestic environments, the financing, planning,
preparation, and perpetration of terrorist acts, as well as the support of
terrorist actions, so that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of the
respective acts.7 The result of this decision, lacking proper monitoring of
its implementation by individual Member States, may not only be a rain-
bow of individual and diversified national legislative responses, but a
variety of eventual hurdles generated by a multitude of different ap-
proaches. This strategy, probably adopted in light of the failed experiences
at the General Assembly level to agree on a unified general convention on
terrorism, and particularly on its definition, is the main problem relating to
the Council having elected a diversified, country by country approach to
the criminalization of international terrorism.
The Council's decision was certainly in line with most United Nations
conventions and protocols dealing with international terrorism, which re-
quire Member States to criminalize the acts covered by them, making such
acts "punishable by appropriate penalties which (should) take into account
the grave nature of those offences."8 Resolution 1373 was considered to be
"far reaching," since it imposed obligations on Member States which are
normally contained in treaties entered into through the traditional treaty-
making process. 9 It has been called "the cornerstone of the United Na-
tions"' counterterrorism efforts, creating the Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC) as a subsidiary organ of the Council, to monitor its
implementation.' 0
As is customary, the CTC has, up to now, relied almost exclusively
on written reports, although it has been correctly pointed out that "effec-
tive monitoring" of the implementation of Resolution 1373 "may (at
6. See G.A. Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 9/18/2001, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (condemning
the Sept. 11 th attacks); see also TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL
BAR ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 29
(Transnational Publishers 2003) [hereinafter IBA Report].
7. Hale E. Sheppard, U.S. Actions to Freeze Assets of Terrorism: Manifest and Latent
Implications for Latin America, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 625, 629-30 (2002).
8. Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different Approaches, 8
NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 215, 220-21 (2002) (quoting International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 2, adopted Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205).
9. Nicholas Rostow, Before and After: The Changed U.N. Response to Terrorism since
September 11th, 35 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 475,482-83 (2002); see generally Malvina Halberstam,
The Evolution of the United Nations Position on Terrorism: From Exempting National Liberation
Movements to Criminalizing Terrorism Wherever and by Whomever Committed, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 573 (2003).
10. Eric Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counterterrorism Committee,
and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 333, 333 (2003).
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some point) require site visits to capitals, something that the CTC has so
far shied away from supporting."'" A structural inability to proactively
seek effective means of enforcement forces the CTC to rely only on
"paper" truths, as opposed to "ground" truths. In fact, Resolution 1373
does not explicitly authorize the CTC to undertake such "on site" visits.
In view of this shortcoming, several members of the CTC took the
position that today's CTC is simply not legally authorized to hold face to
face conversations with Member States other than, eventually, at the
United Nations' New York headquarters. This is part of what has been
defined as the "implementation gap" at the national level, 2 which has
always confronted the Council.
The Council's recent unanimous enactment of Resolution 1535, in
2004,"3 may change that perception.14 With this new resolution, the
Council decided to revitalize and restructure the CTC. For this purpose, it
endorsed the report on this subject previously submitted by the CTC
itself. 5 It created the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
(CTED), as part of the CTC. The CTED will be able to visit individual
Member States, provided they consent to such visits. In addition, the
CTED will report regularly, at least once a month, on (i) the progress of
States in their implementation of Resolution 1373, and (ii) their
participation in international conventions and protocols related to
terrorism. 6
A. Several Steps Forward on the Afghan
Front May Change the Picture
On October 15, 1999, again in connection with international terror-
ism, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, passed
Resolution 1267.'" Under Paragraph 4(b), all UN Member States had to
(1) freeze funds and other financial resources including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
Taliban or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, and
11. Id. at 339-40.
12. JAKE SHERMAN, POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR REGULATING RESOURCE FLOWS TO
ARMED CONFLICT 8 (International Peace Academy 2002).
13. S.C. Res. 1535, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1535 (2004).
14. U.N. Security Council Press Release SC/8041, Security Council Restructures
Counter-Terrorism Committee, March 26, 2004 (announcing unanimous enactment of Res.
1535).
15. S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 13, at I (endorsing committee's report); Proposal for
the Revitalisation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Annex to Letter dated 19 February
2004 from the Chairman of the CTC, U.N. Doc. S/2004/124 (2004).
16. Proposal for the Revitalisation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, supra note 15,
at §§ 15 (i), (k), (n).
17. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
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(2) ensure that neither those funds nor any other funds or financial re-
sources so designated could be made available by their nationals or by
any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or
any undertaking owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Tali-
ban, except as authorized by the Sanctions Committee created by
Resolution 1373.18
The Sanctions Committee was supposed to, inter alia, (1) seek from
all Member States further information regarding the actions taken by
them, with a view to effectively implementing the freezing orders;
(2) consider information brought to its attention by Member Sates on
violations of the freezing measures, and recommend appropriate meas-
ures in response thereto; (3) make periodic reports to the Council on the
impact, including the respective humanitarian implications, of the meas-
ures enacted by Resolution 1373 and on alleged violations of them,
identifying possible violators; and (4) consider requests for exemptions
from the freezing measures imposed by Resolution 1373. In turn, all
Member States were asked to report to the Sanctions Committee, within
30 days of the coming into force of the measures imposed, on the steps
taken with a view to effectively implementing such measures.19
On December 19, 2000, by Resolution 1333,20 the then ongoing
freezing measures were extended to include Al-Qaida, Osama Bin
Laden, and individuals and entities associated with them. The Sanctions
Committee, since it is made-up of diplomats, was asked to appoint a
"Committee of Experts" to report on the implementation of the measures
established by Resolution 1267." For this purpose, the "Committee of
Experts" was expressly authorized to consult with all relevant Member
States.22 The Sanctions Committee was further mandated, for the pur-
poses of the freezing of funds and assets, to establish and maintain
"updated lists" (including the "list") based on information provided by
the Member States and regional organizations, of individuals and entities
associated with Osama Bin Laden.23
Up to now, no legal safeguards have been built in reference to the
freezing of funds and assets. The possibility that innocent persons could
timely and effectively challenge the freezing is in fact very restricted,
because those who suffer the freezing have no information as to the fac-
tual basis for their inclusion on the list, nor seem to have available an
established procedure to request its review. A recent International Bar
18. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 2, at 16.
19. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 13, at 10.
20. S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000).
21. Id. at 15(a).
22. Id. at 15(b).
23. Id. at 16(a).
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Association ("IBA") report on this subject concluded that it is necessary
to (1) allow judicial supervision of such procedure; (2) respect all due
process guarantees; and (3) establish financial provisions for living ex-
penses if necessary, to be provided from frozen funds.24 The Sanctions
Committee was further requested to consider, when and where appropri-
ate, visiting countries near Afghanistan, and such other countries as may
be required to enhance the full and effective implementation of the freez-
ing measures of Resolutions 1267 and 1333.25 Once again, Member
States were also required to report to the Sanctions Committee, within
30 days of the resolution's entry into force, detailing all steps taken to
21implement it effectively.
On July 30, 2001, still before the tragic terrorist attacks, the Security
Council passed Resolution 1363." Under this resolution, the Council,
acting under Chapter VII, and clearly concerned with effectiveness,
requested the Secretary General to establish, in consultation with the
Sanctions Committee, a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the
measures imposed by Resolutions 1267 and 1333, and report back to the
Council with recommendations on how to handle violations of those
• 28
resolutions. This monitoring mechanism was comprised of both a
"Monitoring Group" of experts, based in New York, and a "Sanctions
Enforcement Team," staffed by up to fifteen members, located in the
states bordering the territory of Afghanistan under the Taliban's control."
The results of the combined efforts of both teams were to be reported toS 30
the Council through the Sanctions Committee, whose means and
resources were clearly upgraded. In addition, the Council urged all
Member States to enforce and strengthen the freezing measures under
their respective national legislation and reiterated the Member States'
obligation to inform the Council of all measures adopted with respect to
Resolutions 1267 and 1333.' The enactment of this third resolution
32
suggests that the Council was, indeed, deeply concerned that financial
flows to the Taliban and Al-Qaida, notwithstanding previous Council
resolutions, seemed to continue.
On January 16, 2002 (subsequent to the enactment of Resolution
1373), the Council enacted Resolution 1390.33 Under this resolution, it
24. IBA Report, supra note 6, at 127.
25. S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, I 16(f), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000).
26. Id. at 20.
27. S.C. Res. 1363, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (2001).
28. Id. at [3.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id. at 8.
32. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 27.
33. S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002).
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was decided that the freezing of funds, assets and resources of the
Taliban, A1-Qaida, and Osama Bin Laden had to be complemented by
Member States' ensuring that no funds were made directly or indirectly
34
available for such persons' benefit. Furthermore, the resolution re-
quested the Sanctions Committee regularly to update the "list" created
pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1333, and make it available to the pub-
lic through the appropriate media.35 Notwithstanding these efforts, the
Council's saga with some of the Members States' uncooperative reaction
(or simply non-reaction) vis-t-vis its resolutions on Afghanistan, contin-
ued.
On January 17, 2003, the Council enacted another resolution on the
subject, Resolution 1455.36 Through this resolution, the Council decided,
for the first time, to "improve" the implementation of the freezing meas-
ures of Resolutions 1267, 1333, and 1390, and anticipated the need for a
second "improvement" of the freezing regime to be completed twelve
months down the road or sooner.
For such a purpose, the Council requested better coordination and
increased exchange of information between the Sanctions Committee
and the CTC.37 It also instructed the Sanctions Committee to communi-
cate to all Member States the text of the "list" at least every three
38
months, and also called upon Member States to submit an updated na-
tional report to the Sanctions Committee not later than ninety days from
the adoption of the resolution, detailing steps taken to implement the
previous freezing orders vis-?-vis the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and Osama Bin
Laden.39
Finally, on January 30, 2004, the Council, actively seized of the matter
and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, enacted Resolution 1526.
40
This recent resolution contains the anticipated second "improvement" of
the freezing measures related to the Taliban, A1-Qaida, and Osama Bin
Laden, which was announced in Resolution 1455. Under it, the Council
strengthened the Sanctions Committee's role by expanding its mandate to
go beyond oversight of the Member States' implementation of the previ-
ous freezing measures, giving it some additional roles, including:
(1) assessing information for the Security Council's review on the imple-
mentation of the freezing measures; and (2) recommending improvements
34. Id. at I 2(a).
35. Id. at T 5.
36. S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (2003).
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 6.
40. S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (2004).
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to the existing set of measures.4' It also established an "Analytical Support
and Sanctions Monitoring Team" to professionally assist the Sanctions
Committee. This particular monitoring team must now present three bi-
annual reports to the Council on Member States' implementation of all the
different freezing measures.
In addition, it requested that the Sanctions Committee (1) visit se-
lected countries to enhance the full and effective implementation of the
freezing measures, with a view to encouraging them to comply fully
with all Council resolutions on this issue;42 (2) follow up, via oral and
written communications, the effective implementation of the freezing
measures, and provide Member States with an opportunity, at the request
of the Sanctions Committee, to send representatives to meet with it for
"more in-depth discussions; 43 (3) report to the Council, on a quarterly
basis and in some detail, on the work of the Sanctions Committee, in-
cluding a summary on the individual Member States progress in
submitting the report previously requested by Resolution 1455; 4 and
(4) circulate an analytical assessment of the implementation of the freez-
ing measures, including both successes and failures, with a view to
recommending further measures,45 which would eventually lead, for the
first time, to "naming and shaming."
Finally, visibly hardening its normal style, the Council decided to
request all Member States that had not submitted the updated reports to
S 46
do so, and to explain, in writing, their reasons for not having complied.
The Council will also receive from the Sanctions Committee a second
"list," one that will include the names of those countries that have not
submitted the reports requested by the Council, with an analytical sum-
mary of the reasons put forward by them for not reporting. This means
that "naming and shaming" itself a mild sanction, could well soon be
available.
B. Back to the CTC
The evolution of the sanction regime against the Taliban, Al-Qaida,
and Osama Bin Laden suggests that similar powers could soon be
granted to the CTC itself. Should this happen, as one can probably
anticipate, the CTC will have at its disposal the instruments required to
make sure that the criminalization of terrorist activities at the national
level is homogenized. To reduce the existing risk of "definitional
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. atj 10.
43. Id. at 11.
44. Id. at$ 12.
45. Id. at 13.
46. Id. at$ 22.
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fragmentation," this could be done by a combination of "soft"
suggestions and eventually some real "hard" jawboning by the officers
of the CTC, when individual country definitions are either soft or
ineffective.
A minimum legal common denominator in the criminalization of in-
ternational terrorism could be achieved by insisting on Member States'
individual criminal legislation's complying with some basic minimum
standards, thus reducing the fragmentation impact arising from the sub-
stantive or procedural hurdles that the co-existence of different and
unrelated individual legal systems may cause. The fight against interna-
tional terrorism will thus achieve a healthy minimum degree of
normative unity. For this to occur, the "hands-on" precedents we have
just reviewed in relation to the resolutions specifically dealing with the
Taliban, Al-Qaida, and Osama Bin Laden, may have to be used to further
strengthen the hands of the CTC. The time for that type of attitude seems
to be approaching.
Rapidly changing events are bringing down the walls of past cul-
tures. As Benjamin N. Cardozo once said, "[t]he inn that shelters for the
night is not the end of the journey. The law, like the traveler, must be
ready for the morrow.,
47
47.
1924).
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 20 (Yale University Press
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